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COMMITTEE HEARINGS OF THE UK PARLIAMENT: WHO GIVES 
EVIDENCE AND DOES THIS MATTER? 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
While evidence hearings by House of Commons select committees have received 
increasing attention by the public and the media in recent years, academic research on 
this topic has remained rather thin. Drawing on both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, this article examines this topic. It begins by explaining why evidence is 
important: (i) it is fundamental to sustain detailed scrutiny; (ii) it builds individual-level 
and institutional-level expertise; and (iii) the range of evidence gathered is used by 
committees to engage with the public. The article then presents empirical data of the pool 
of witnesses on which committees rely, which arguably does not reflect the UK population, 
which raises important further questions over the representative claims of committees. 
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Select committee hearings in the UK House of Commons have become increasingly high 
profile in recent years: in July 2011, for example, an intense and high-profile hearing was 
dramatically interrupted after Rupert Murdoch, chief executive of News Corporation, was 
assaulted with a foam pie (the afternoon, with two other witnesses, lasted close to five 
hours) (The Guardian, 2011); later that year, in November 2011, members of the Public 
Accounts Committee were unhappy with a civil servant’s answers to questions and 
subsequently forced him to swear an oath to tell the truth as part of the committee’s 
investigations (Public Accounts Committee, 2011); and, more recently, Sir Philip Green 
was summoned to attend a hearing in June 2016 to answer questions over the collapse of 
BHS, leading to a range of heated exchanges between himself and committee members 
(Work and Pensions Committee and Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, 2016).  
 
The above three examples of sustained scrutiny made headline news, yet they are only the 
tip of the work being undertaken by select committees. Indeed, these committees have 
been scrutinising government policy for centuries. However, the current system of 
committees to shadow ministerial departments (with the addition of cross-cutting 
committees) were established in 1979, following long-standing calls for reform to enhance 
scrutiny in Parliament (e.g. Crick, 1964). As early as 1983, the new system was seen as a 
success, and has continued to be praised ever since (for an overview, see Kelso (2009a)). 
In particular, select committees are seen as an important counter-weight to bill 
committees (formerly standing committees) that consider legislation line-by-line because 
the former operate in a cross-party manner that is almost entirely absent from bill 
committees. And although government is not forced to adopt any recommendations from 
select committees, committees can play an important role in influencing government 
policy (e.g. Benton and Russell (2013) found that 40% of committee recommendations 
were accepted between 1997 and 2010. This policy influence has grown in tandem with a 
growing media spotlight (Dunleavy and Muir, 2013; Kubala, 2011), indicating the 
importance of these committees to parliamentary scrutiny at Westminster. 
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Despite the belief that select committees have growing policy impact, however, there has 
been far less academic research about the basis on which those reports are made, and 
especially from whom committees gather evidence (though see Berry and Kippin, 2014; 
Pedersen et. al., 2015; on evidence and bill committees, see Thompson, 2015, pp.94-118). 
That is despite the fact that evidence is taken by most committees on a routine, everyday 
basis, and one of the most central aspects of committee work. This article changes this by 
providing a specific snapshot of evidence gathered by parliamentary select committees 
during the 2010 parliament.  
 
This research draws on a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative data. First, it draws 
on non-participant and participant observation over a period of 14 weeks in the House of 
Commons Committee Office. It is participant in the sense that the author was placed in 
the Committee Office as research assistant, and non-participant in the sense that the 
author used as much further time to observe committees in both private and public 
sessions during those 14 weeks. This was crucial to understand the ways of working of 
committees and the everyday behaviours of chairs, members and staff in undertaking 
inquiries and their interactions with evidence. Second, this article relies on interviews with 
committee members, chairs and staff (totalling 43 interviews), as well as countless 
informal conversations during fieldwork. These were fundamental to understand how key 
actors interpreted their role on committees (in particular what scrutiny meant to MPs and 
staff, and how they used evidence to scrutinise government). Interviews were semi-
structured and open because their focus was on the interviewee’s interpretation of their 
role. As such, an open form of thematic coding was used to summarise interview data; 
quotes were selected according to prevalence of key theme or links to concepts identified 
in fieldwork. Third, this article uses a database of witnesses that gave evidence to 
committees over one parliamentary session (Session 2013-14), which in total came to 
1,238 committee sessions, featuring 3,225 witnesses. Additionally, the article draws on 
insights from a workshop with parliamentary staff undertaken in 2016 to understand how 
committees engage with particular types of evidence (Author, 2017). The data for this 
article is therefore part of a wider set of projects that explore committee scrutiny in a range 
of ways. 
 
In sum, this article presents the most detailed summary of who gave oral evidence to 
House of Commons select committees to date. Aforementioned studies have looked at 
witnesses in legislative settings (including the UK), but none have sought to break down 
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witness data in similar detail. This article finds that committee hearings matter in a range 
of crucial ways: they underpin scrutiny processes and ensure that recommendations and 
conclusions are based on evidence heard by a committee; on an individual-level, it allows 
Members of Parliament (MPs) to build policy-specific expertise and practise scrutiny 
roles, and, at an institutional-level, to gather information for Parliament to inform policy-
making processes; and they matter for wider symbolic public engagement. Given the 
importance of hearings, the question of who gives evidence becomes significant. Here, the 
article adds new empirical data, finding that: committees rely on charities and campaign 
groups, business and trade associations, and professional associations; witnesses come 
predominantly from London and the south of England; and there is a significant gender 
disparity where three-quarters of witnesses are men and one quarter are women. This 
raises a question about the extent to which committees are receiving the best available 
evidence for their scrutiny work, as well as questions over the representativeness of 
evidence and whether the House of Commons has a wider responsibility to ensure diverse 
representation in committee hearings. In sum, this article deepens our understanding of 
committee hearings in Parliament, and presents new data on who gives oral evidence. To 
do so, the following article is structured into three sections: first, a detailed examination 
of the role of evidence; second, a summary of who gives oral evidence to committees; and 
third, a wider discussion of these findings. 
 
 
I. Why do committee hearings matter? 
 
There are at least three substantive reasons for why committee hearings deserve detailed 
analysis: first, they serve as the foundation for conducting scrutiny; second, they allow 
MPs to build both individual-level and institutional-level expertise; and third, they can 
build a bridge between governing elites and the public as a form of engagement at a time 
of widespread (and growing) public distrust in political institutions (compare to bill 
committees: Thompson, 2015, pp.94-118). It is worth discussing each factor in detail. 
 
1.1. Conducting scrutiny 
 
Departmental select committees exist to: ‘examine the expenditure, administration and 
policy’ of government departments and their associated public bodies (HC SO No. 152(1)). 
In addition to departmental committees, a range of further committees exist to scrutinise 
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government: cross-cutting select committees provide thematic, whole-of-government 
scrutiny; domestic or internal committees look at administrative issues within the House 
of Commons; joint committees with the House of Lords may be established to provide 
more detailed scrutiny across Parliament; and, other ad hoc or temporary committees may 
examine specific issues. Committees are cross-party and – in the case of departmental and 
cross-cutting investigative committees – made up of usually 11 members (though this can 
vary between nine and 18). The party balance reflects that of the House of Commons, both 
within each committee and with respect to chairships allocated to committees as a whole 
(for a detailed summary, see Rogers and Walters (2015)).  
 
In order to carry out scrutiny, committees usually undertake inquiries, which involves 
taking written and oral evidence before publishing a final report. Committees can 
investigate any topic of their choosing (guided – at least in theory – by the Liaison 
Committee’s core tasks). Increasingly, committees have also begun to hold one-off 
evidence sessions, undertake ‘evidence checks’ and scrutinise government in more 
innovative ways to engage the public (Liaison Committee, 2015). All select committees 
have the power to ‘send for persons, papers and records’ (HC SO 152(4a)). They are 
supported by a small secretariat of around six permanent members of staff that work 
towards the committees’ inquiries full-time, as well as specialist advisers that are 
appointed on an ad hoc, part-time basis. In general, there is a growing acceptance that 
committees are important actors in influencing government policy. Most recently, 
Meghan Benton and Meg Russell (2013) looked at the influence of seven case study 
committees between 1997 and 2010, finding that 40% of recommendations made by 
committees are accepted by government, including 55% of small-level, 31% of medium-
level, and 14% of large-level proposed changes (see also: Hindmoor et. al., 2009; Russell 
and Cowley, 2016). 
 
Given these practices, evidence is crucial for parliamentary committees because the 
evidence-gathering process is a central mechanism through which select committees 
conduct scrutiny and accountability of government in the first place. Evidence gathered 
over the course of an inquiry summarises the best available knowledge on a particular 
policy matter. As Benton and Russell have argued (2013, pp.789-90), policy 
recommendations are more likely to be considered and taken up by ministers if they are 
evidence-based, and especially if committees offer an original contribution to the existing 
base of evidence in a particular policy area. Unlike written evidence, oral evidence is 
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valuable because it is a process that receives widespread attention and detailed analysis 
by a committee; further, it allows a level of interrogation that other forms of evidence-
gathering cannot offer. Whether this is imparting knowledge from an academic or 
presenting the findings from a think tank report, this is the best opportunity for a 
committee to understand empirical data on a policy issue. Similarly, evidence can be used 
to reveal policy failings or limitations. So, directly hearing from a business, professional 
group or trade union allows committees to raise those issues in detail. Taking oral 
evidence allows committees to examine the extent to which policies are working and to 
expose limitations. 
 
1.2. Building expertise 
 
Closely related to the above, evidence-gathering has important epistemic value, which falls 
into two areas: the individual-level and the institutional-level. At the individual level, the 
evidence-gathering process matters because it gives MPs structure to the scrutiny aspect 
of their role and, importantly, to build policy expertise. Policy learning through gathering 
evidence allows MPs to, as one chair put it, ‘really get your teeth into something’ (interview 
with committee chair 05). Another MP said that being on a select committee is key for 
access and finding out information because it offers MPs ‘a chance to get in-depth access 
in a particular area’. He explained that, while MPs generally have good access to a range 
of individuals and groups by virtue of their position, it is only through committee 
membership that access to reticent individuals is likely to be ensured (interview with MP 
03).  
 
For some MPs, joining a committee is an opportunity to deepen their pre-existing 
knowledge (and likely use it to advocate for policy change); for others, it involves learning 
about something new and different to their previous employment background. One MP, 
for example, described it as ‘a good education to me, having come in as a new MP’ 
(interview with MP 20). This seems especially important given the absence of systematic 
and professional training for representatives (Coghill et. al., 2008). During ethnographic 
fieldwork, it was noticeable that some MPs were practising a point they would make later 
in the chamber (or elsewhere). So, MPs use committee hearings not only to conduct 
analysis of government policy, but to literally practise scrutiny activity at private and 
public sessions to pick up effective questioning skills, develop different arguments, test 
ideas on others, etc. Furthermore, in recent years, committees have given training to their 
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committee members, usually by an experienced QC or journalist (interview with 
committee staff 08). For individual MPs, then, committees offer informal professional 
training and allow for policy learning. 
 
Taking this a little further, it is possible to argue that evidence serves a wider benefit by 
the way in which Parliament can build policy expertise in institutional terms. Committee 
evidence can be used by MPs in other parts of their work, but reports and their evidence 
can also be cross-referenced by other committees, used by the Parliamentary Office for 
Science and Technology, adopted by the House of Commons Library, or used in the House 
of Lords. In this way, committee evidence is able to alleviate information asymmetries 
between government and legislature. As Mark Goodwin (2015) has pointed out, the 
strengthening of scientific advice by government as part of wider commitments to 
evidence-based policy-making means that there are dangers for Parliament in being 
unable to scrutinise decisions based on scientific advice because Parliament itself does not 
have similar capacities to draw on equal levels of scientific advice. Committees’ evidence-
gathering processes are a way to address this, and questioning in oral evidence is 
especially important because it gives opportunities for MPs to address their own skills as 
well as strengthen Parliament’s wider scrutiny capabilities (similar thoughts were echoed 
regarding bill committees; see Thomspon, 2015, pp.101-2).  
 
1.3. Building public engagement 
 
More generally, and drawing out of the two points above, evidence-gathering provides 
those who are affected by a particular policy with the opportunity to make their views 
known on the operation and impact of that policy. In other words, evidence matters on a 
wider parliamentary-societal level. As one clerk put it: 
 
A lot of people are unhappy about [x policy] and they may continue to be unhappy but 
at least the committee’s given them an opportunity to say what they think and shows 
that, you know, Parliament is taking notice of it (interview with committee staff 11). 
 
In this sense, evidence is about ‘giving people a voice’. The context of widespread (and 
growing) distrust of political institutions is very important in this regard because it has 
had a direct effect on select committees. Increasingly, the public are seen to be apathetic 
of political institutions, as seen with declining voter turnout across not only Europe (where 
turnout fell from an average of 81.7% in the 1990s to 75.8% in the 2000s (Mair, 2013)) but 
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across the globe (global turnout in elections fell from 70% in the 1990s to 66% in the 
period 2011-15 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2016). 
Parliaments and legislatures are at the forefront of debates about political engagement 
because they are usually the central representative body in a nation’s political system, and 
usually also with low levels of trust and satisfaction (e.g. the overall satisfaction with the 
UK Parliament is at 30% according to the Hansard Society (2017)). This has become 
especially important because the public are increasingly challenging traditional ideas of 
representative politics in favour of participatory forms of democracy (Dalton et. al., 2003; 
Judge, 2014). 
 
In order to combat disengagement, parliaments across Europe and beyond have 
attempted to build sustained relationships between themselves and their publics in recent 
years (Leston-Bandeira, 2013). Some have focused on reinvigorating websites to build 
transparency and openness (Joshi and Rosenfield, 2013), others have created 
sophisticated petitions systems to enhance direct engagement with citizens (Hough, 
2012). In the UK, we have seen the establishment of Parliamentary Outreach and a 
dedicated public engagement strategy (Leston-Bandeira, 2016), the strengthening of 
petitions (a Petitions Committee was established in 2015 with powers to hold debates), 
and embracing digital technologies to ensure transparency and openness (e.g. streaming 
of all parliamentary business and building the parliamentary website as a rich repository 
of information). This forms part of a more general trend from the Speaker of House of 
Commons, who has been strongly committed to both broadening and deepening public 
engagement: in 2009, he established the Speaker’s Advisory Council on Public 
Engagement; in 2013, he established the Speaker’s Commission on Digital Democracy; 
and in 2016, he launched the Commons Reference Group on Representation and Inclusion 
to explore options for how Parliament can promote social diversity (Childs, 2016). 
 
These trends have had a distinct effect on select committees. Not only has the importance 
of representation led to new committees (in addition to the Petitions Committee, we have 
seen the creation of the Women and Equalities Committee in 2015 to examine social 
diversity), parliamentary committees are increasingly seen as a crucial mechanism by 
which citizens can engage with the House of Commons (Marsh, 2016a, 2016b). This is in 
part to rebuild trust following the MPs’ Expenses Scandal (Kelso, 2009b), and in part 
because members of the public generally seem to respond positively to select committee 
scrutiny (Hansard Society, 2014). In a sign of changing times, select committees have 
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adopted a new ‘core task’ (Task 10) to guide their committee work in 2012: ‘To assist the 
House of Commons in better engaging with the public by ensuring that the work of the 
committee is accessible to the public’ (Liaison Committee, 2012, paras 16-20; see also, 
Liaison Committee, 2015). The evidence-gathering process is a crucial element to this 
because evidence gives the public a route to potentially impact parliamentary proceedings 
beyond placing an x on a ballot paper once every five years and, more generally, sustain 
the link between elected representatives and citizens. Even if committees may not be the 
most appropriate vehicles for public engagement (given their design as vehicles for 
scrutiny of government), committees see themselves as critical actors to further public 
engagement and represent the public in their inquiries in order to reverse public 
disengagement with Parliament more generally. This raises wider questions about the role 
of committees vis-à-vis expertise and the public to which we return in the third and 
concluding sections of this article. In any case, committees have become increasingly 
committed to ensuring the diversity of witnesses as part of wider public engagement 
strategies. 
 
1.4. Committee hearings as a privileged arena for evidence 
 
What the previous sub-sections reveal is that evidence-gathering by select committees 
matters for a variety of reasons to ensure the fully-functioning of British representative 
democracy, something that parliamentarians themselves have acknowledged through 
commitments to widening engagement (Liaison Committee, 2012, 2015) and diversity 
(Commons Reference Group on Representation). As part of this, oral evidence is especially 
important. As the introduction to this article implied, oral evidence is the most high-
profile form of participation in select committee inquiries. It is these sessions which will 
be picked up by the media and most likely to be subjected to scrutiny by MPs. Given a 
changing media landscape that focuses more directly on visual and audio-visual 
information (e.g. broadcast media, the growth of BBC Parliament, creation of 
parliamentlive.tv), committee hearings bring evidence, knowledge and scientific advice to 
life that no written piece of evidence could do. As a result, committee hearings are the 
places where evidence makes its biggest impact, and are also most likely what the public 
sees of the evidence-gathering process. In that sense, witnesses can be seen to embody 
evidence and play a wider symbolic role (Leston-Bandeira, 2016).  
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In addition, committee chairs and members are more likely to attend evidence hearings 
and listen to oral evidence, rather than read submissions of written evidence. A range of 
interviewees admitted, for example, that they could not find the time to read, let alone 
analyse, hundreds of pieces of written evidence as part of an inquiry. Instead, analysing 
written evidence is a task that often falls to parliamentary staff (something made clear 
during ethnographic fieldwork). This factor was reinforced by a recent workshop on 
academic engagement with committees, where one participant noted:  
 
[Witnesses] give them [MPs] that personal experience … Not something written down 
on a piece of paper that’s got some numbers that completely contradict what they know 
to be true. It’s talking to someone else that allows them to see someone else with a 
different experience and a broader awareness that might make them think, “Oh, maybe 
that’s true in my [constituency], but elsewhere…”, give them a nuance of information. 
It’s why who delivers it is important as well. Because if it’s someone sitting there who 
is glib, persuasive, authoritative, they take that on board much better than a dusty old 
man (House of Commons select committee staff 01). 
 
MPs tend to rely on evidence from their constituencies or anecdotal evidence (often from 
the media), or wider pre-existing ideas. What committee hearings are able to do, as this 
quote illustrates, is to bring research and scientific advice to life and, in doing so, overcome 
biases that MPs may have picked up.  
 
In light of the above, who is invited to give oral evidence reveals to us the priorities and 
interests of select committees, especially due to finite time and attention available to 
committees. One MP noted:  
 
We need to get information in a certain format to allow us to prepare the report … you 
can’t rely on evidence which you haven’t actually taken as a committee. So that’s why 
choosing the witnesses is key because you want to get [a] certain, you know, flavour 
across (interview with MP 20). 
 
In this sense, committee hearings serve as a proxy for access; they represent a space of 
privilege to present evidence, information and advice to Parliament. This, then, raises 
fundamental questions over who committees choose to hear from. It is to this question 
that our discussion now turns. 
 
 
II. Who gives oral evidence? 
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Given the range of roles that committee hearings play in the House of Commons, it is 
worth exploring who gives evidence in more detail. However, publicly available data on 
this is fairly thin and is frequently limited to name and organisational affiliation. Further 
inferences can be made from this, such as social function, gender and geographical 
location. Other data, such as social diversity statistics (e.g. age, disability, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation), are more difficult to collect. Nonetheless, some research on parliaments and 
legislatures has emerged. Darren Halpin et. al. (2012), for example, look at interest groups 
in the Scottish Parliament, and find that there is a core of participants who are heavily 
engaged in evidence-gathering processes (both in terms of written evidence and oral 
hearings), which raises a number of subsequent questions about ‘usual suspects’ in 
parliamentary proceedings. Elsewhere, Rebecca Rumbul (2016) examines the gender 
balance of witnesses at the National Assembly for Wales, finding that witnesses are 
overwhelmingly male and evidence sessions are conducted in a gendered atmosphere. 
This similarly questions the representativeness of the legislature’s evidence base. Both of 
these sub-national examples are complemented by a national (though thus far isolated) 
report published by Richard Berry and Sean Kippin (2014). Their research focuses on 
evidence taken by Parliament (including House of Commons committees, House of Lords 
committees, and joint committees) between October and November 2013. Their report 
echoes the sub-national findings from Halpin et. al. and Rumbul, in that the authors found 
not only a startling gender gap (24.7% of all witnesses were women), but additionally that 
trade associations were arguably over-represented due to their frequent appearances. 
There has also been some research on the evidence-taking process for bill committees, an 
innovation introduced in 2007 (Thompson, 2015, pp.94-118) (though unrelated to select 
committee scrutiny). Beyond the UK, there has been limited further research. For 
example, Helene Helboe Pedersen et. al. (2015) compare the effect of institutional 
arrangements and other factors to giving evidence in the UK, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, which found that it is not necessarily structural state-society relations that 
solely affect the relationship between legislature and public, but the institutional 
arrangements themselves (such as the open or closed nature of evidence hearings); 
elsewhere, Manda Green (2016) has explored women’s participation in the National 
Assembly of France and found, similarly to others, that women are underrepresented in 
legislative scrutiny. 
 
Aside from the above studies, there has been little further published research on the 
relationship between witnesses and committees, especially not in the UK. Given the 
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importance of evidence in scrutiny processes covered above, this is perhaps a little 
surprising, but something that this article seeks to correct. In a similar vein to the 
approaches taken by others, this relies on information that the UK Parliament makes 
available: name and organisational affiliation. This article looks at 24 departmental and 
cross-cutting select committees from the House of Commons between 08 May 2013 and 
14 May 2014 (Session 2013-14). During this time, there were 1,238 committee hearings, 
featuring 3,225 witnesses. This dataset gives us new data on who gives evidence to 
committees that we did not know before: other studies have had a different focus (either 
sub-national or international) or relied on a very small dataset. This dataset, by contrast, 
offers a systematic account of oral evidence over the course of an entire parliamentary 
session in the House of Commons. A full summary of the data is given in Table 1. Overall, 
the Public Accounts Committee had the most witnesses (255), closely followed by the 
Transport Committee (252); meanwhile the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) had the 
fewest (34 witnesses). The ESC is arguably an anomalous case because it examines draft 
European Union legislation. The Liaison Committee has been excluded because it is 
neither a departmental nor cross-cutting committee with few inquiries and evidence 
sessions that would otherwise skew the overall findings. On average, each committee 
heard evidence from 134 witnesses. This can be broken down further (based on available 
data from the House of Commons): (i) organisational affiliation; (ii) geographical 
breakdown; and, (iii) gender balance. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
2.1. Organisations 
 
While the smallest category, ‘Other’, covers an amorphous grouping of witnesses that 
would be too small to meaningfully disaggregate further (e.g. it includes ‘service users 
and/or members of the public’ that make up 0.4% of witnesses), the single biggest category 
of witness is ‘civil service and public sector’, which makes up 36.8% of all witnesses over 
the parliamentary session. Looking at the figures for government, the civil service and the 
public sector, it reminds us that public service delivery is both complex and fragmented, 
but also – and more importantly – that civil servants appear in front of select committees 
on a regular basis. Though change over time is not shown here, these findings reinforce 
the trend indicated by other research that public servants have become public-facing 
figures (exemplified perhaps most clearly by the (mistaken) claim by the then-chair of the 
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Public Accounts Committee, Margaret Hodge, to a civil servant in 2011 that he is 
accountable to Parliament and not accountable to the relevant departmental minister 
(Public Accounts Committee, 2011, Ev 39-40)) (Grube, 2014). 
 
The data also shows the clear importance placed on charities and/or campaign groups, 
business and/or trade associations, and professional associations. Trade unions made up 
only 7.1% of non-profit witnesses, much smaller than business and/or trade associations 
(21.7%). Moreover, Table 1 shows us the prominence given to multi-national businesses 
and large/national businesses (46.4% and 31.3% respectively) over small and medium-
sized businesses (19.4%). Meanwhile, the higher education sector made up 8.1% of all 
witnesses. Generally, university-led research groups were subsumed into their university 
categories (such as the Glasgow Media Group into the University of Glasgow or the 
Institute of Education into University College London). The higher education category was 
examined in more detail by looking at institutional affiliations. These affiliations were 
used as a proxy to illustrate the nature of the types of universities that gave evidence. So, 
University Alliance tend to be business-engaged universities; Million Plus represents 
newer universities; Russell Group universities are perceived to be traditional research-
intensive institutions; and Oxbridge (though part of the Russell Group) represent the two 
most elite universities in the UK. Of course, these affiliations are not without problems 
because many universities did not fit into an affiliated group and were therefore labelled 
‘non-affiliated’. With this caveat in mind, the data still shows a predominance of Russell 
Group universities (75.6%). This is not necessarily surprising because these universities 
tend to be perceived as successful research institutes (either through research audits or 
through reputation). However, it also demonstrates the clear preference for universities 
with close proximity to London: of the 15 most frequent higher education witnesses, 7 
come from London or the south of England (see Table 2 and Table 3). This brings us to 
geographical location of witnesses. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
2.2. Geography 
 
This dataset makes an attempt not only to give an insight into the organisational affiliation 
of witnesses, but also their location. This is important because it allows us an insight into 
the geographical range, particularly shedding light on the reach of select committee 
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evidence-gathering. Additionally, it indicates the accessibility for witnesses to give 
evidence from different parts of the country. However, this data is gathered with difficulty 
for three reasons. First, location is not generally listed in oral evidence records 
(universities are an obvious exception and therefore discussed in more detail). Second, the 
main office or primary location of an organisation might not be the same work location 
for witnesses (for example, staff may work from home, live in a different region and 
commute to work, work at a different office to listed headquarters of organisations, and 
so on). And third, some witnesses might travel regularly or might be in London over the 
course of an inquiry and therefore this would not impede their availability to attend. 
Furthermore, the data for some witnesses is simply not known.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
These findings, then, are not definitive. Nonetheless, a large amount of information is 
available online through publicly available records. This reveals, even when government, 
civil service and public sector witnesses are excluded, that London dominates. As Table 3 
shows, it makes up close to half of all witnesses (47.1%), followed by the south of England 
(18.0%). The other parts of the UK make up a much smaller proportion, with the north of 
England and Scotland representing 7.9% and 8.3% respectively, and the Midlands 
reaching 5.3%. Over the 2013-14 parliamentary session, more witnesses seem to come 
from abroad (4.1%) than from Wales and Northern Ireland combined (3.8%). This trend 
is replicated for geographical distribution of universities, where data is most reliable. This 
shows a predominance of universities in London and the south of England, which together 
make up more than half of all university witnesses. 
 
Two caveats must be attached to these findings. First, a range of committees were 
exploring the potential impact of the Scottish independence referendum during Session 
2013-14. This could explain why Scotland had a higher number of witnesses than might 
otherwise be expected (given other trends). Second, these findings could also be explained 
by the growing importance of devolution. Devolved legislatures in Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland have their own evidence-gathering processes and policy competences 
(which continue to grow), so witnesses might be drawn to legislatures in those areas and 
not involved or interested in appearing before committees in Westminster. As such, a 
smaller proportion of witnesses for those regions is expected.  
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2.3. Gender 
 
A key headline raised from Berry and Kippin’s research is the low number of women that 
participated in committee hearings: of 583 witnesses, 24.7% were women (or 144); of all 
Commons witnesses they counted (391), 23.5% were women (or 92). They also looked 
specifically at the organisational and committee breakdown, all of which reveal a strong 
disparity that favours men over women (with only one exception, a temporary committee 
to scrutinise the Mental Capacity Act 2005) (Berry and Kippin, 2014, pp.10-13). However, 
their data covers only one month of a parliamentary session that may have been 
unrepresentative, and while more recent research for the National Assembly for Wales 
echoes the overall gender disparity (over a 12-year period, only 27% of witnesses were 
women (Rumbul, 2016, pp.70-1)), more definitive data for the UK has been missing until 
now. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 and 2 here] 
 
Data for this article shows that, of 3,335 witnesses, 24.6% were women (or 792 witnesses). 
This is broken down by committee in Figure 1 and by organisation in Figure 2. This reveals 
that the Treasury Committee called the smallest proportion of women to give evidence 
(8.1%), while the International Development Committee called the highest (42.2%). 
Neither committees nor organisational groups called an equal number of women and men. 
Private sector witnesses were particularly unrepresentative, where women constituted 
only 11.7% of all witnesses.  
 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The data presented here questions the diversity of the evidence on which committees 
depend. The organisational breakdown reveals that committees rely heavily on 
representative associations, particularly professional bodies, trade associations, and large 
and multi-national companies. By comparison, trade unions, small and medium-sized 
businesses, and service users or members of the public made up a smaller proportion. This 
can be explained by the fact that the former often represent particular interests or groups. 
Committees are far more likely to hear from these groups as a matter of efficiency, i.e. 
gathering evidence from an organisation that has already collated a set of voices, rather 
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than doing so itself. Moreover, committees are also gathering evidence in other ways, such 
as written evidence or visits outside the Palace of Westminster (between 2010 and 2015, 
committees went on 640 visits (based on sessional returns)). These forms of gathering 
evidence may be a reason why members of the public do not frequently participate in 
committee hearings; they are presumed to feed into inquiries informally. Nonetheless, 
research conducted by Matthew Flinders et. al., for the Liaison Committee, notes that 
public engagement has been ‘uneven’ and it is not ‘fully embedded’ into the culture of 
Parliament (Liaison Committee, 2015, para 91). This is in part because committees 
continue to depend on oral evidence as the most important aspect of the evidence-
gathering process. 
 
Turning to the location of witnesses, this indicates that Parliament is not listening to the 
public from across the country. Axiomatically, committees are constrained rather 
significantly in this regard as they cannot choose where organisations should be based. 
London and the south of England contain the headquarters of almost all major banks, 
significant centres of the media and arts world, the hubs of many major industries, and at 
least 50% of the FTSE 100, and the UK’s biggest airports. Further, potential witnesses may 
be drawn to Cardiff, Belfast or Edinburgh rather than Westminster given devolution. So, 
in that sense, these findings may well reflect wider dynamics about UK territorial 
governance. Once again, committees can use site visits as a way to alleviate the 
predominance of the south over other areas of the UK. Nonetheless, it arguably raises a 
question over the extent to which committees are receiving the best available evidence 
from across the country, especially if investigating policies that affect all areas of the UK. 
In any case, it reinforces perceptions that the UK Parliament is focusing predominantly 
on London and southern England. 
 
Diversity of witnesses is also questioned through gender, and specifically that men vastly 
over-represent women in giving evidence in all areas of committee work.1 Perhaps one of 
the most worrying statistics is that, over one week, 25 November to 28 November 2013, 
77 witnesses gave evidence, of which only six were women (or 7.8%). This matters because 
– if the Liaison Committee and the Speaker want to engage the wider public in committee 
work and diversify the social demographics of those getting involved – it suggests that the 
institution is currently falling short in this task. Without descriptive representation in 
                                                     
1 It is not possible to make inferences about other social demographic groups, but anecdotal evidence, based on 
ethnographic fieldwork and comments in interviews, suggest that other groups may also be under-represented. 
 17 
 
Parliament, it could perpetuate the perception that the House of Commons is a closed 
institution and does not hear from witnesses with whom the general public identify. As 
noted previously and by other scholars, this is of significant importance given that 
committee hearings are increasingly being reported by the media and shown in television 
news programmes. Instead, the data suggests that select committee (and this applies to all 
three factors) rely on ‘usual suspects’, i.e. familiar witnesses that give evidence frequently, 
and individuals who are used to speaking in parliamentary or political environments.  
 
How can these trends be explained? There are at least four reasons. First, political balance 
of evidence is an over-riding concern for witnesses. This is to satisfy the political interests 
of members of committees, which can be diverse. In this sense, representation of political 
ideas trump concerns over social diversity. Second, there is a performative element to 
committee hearings. Committees need to ensure that evidence sessions run smoothly and 
are ‘accessible and understandable to members’. Unfortunately, this often means that 
committees depend on witnesses that are confident in a Westminster environment and 
are perceived to be ‘good’ at giving evidence (interview with committee staff 10). In this 
sense, committees are risk averse. Third, there is significant pressure on committee 
timetables. Some committees are highly reactive to news agendas, and so inquiries are 
drawn up at short notice and pre-planned sessions have to be moved from more urgent 
business. It is unsurprising that committees draw heavily from London-based witnesses 
as a result: they have to travel the shortest distanced, are more likely to be available at 
shorter notice, and are more likely to be known in relevant policy circles. Fourth, there are 
some witnesses over which committees simply have no choice due to the focus of the 
inquiry (e.g. the minister or civil servants responsible for a policy area; the business 
leaders that have been affected by a particular policy area the most, etc.). In this sense, as 
covered above, statistics reveal as much about the biases of organisations as they do about 
Parliament (e.g. that men are, on average, highly over-represented in senior positions in 
the private sector, or that London is a predominant geographical area for a range of 
industries). To put it more simply: the pool from which committees seek to draw evidence 
may not be representative itself, so imbalances of gender or location are reflected by 
committees rather than caused by them.  
 
As a result of the everyday and political nature of taking evidence, committees’ room for 
manoeuvre in organising a diverse panel is limited and fraught with difficulty. There is 
also the added question as to whether it is Parliament’s role to actively promote social 
 18 
 
diversity on its panels. In particular, there is a possible tension for committees, who 
arguably wish to both ensure Parliament is able to listen to a broad cross-section of society, 
whilst simultaneously reflect the political wishes, concerns and interests of committee 
members. There are those that could argue that the findings presented here merely reflect 
wider divisions and inequalities in UK society, and the House of Commons committees 
are not themselves a cause for those differences. Others may well argue that Parliament 
should be more proactive, and use the committee system as a pioneer for promoting and 
encouraging social diversity of its witness base. To navigate this dilemma, there are three 
questions that must be considered by parliamentary committees. First, to what extent do 
current trends indicate that select committees are getting the best available evidence (and 
would a stronger encouragement of diversity further enhance or damage the quality of 
evidence gathered?)? Second, what role do select committees have in engaging publics as 
part of their tasks in scrutinising government policy? And third, to what extent does the 
current make-up of witness panels enhance or damage the reputation and legitimacy of 
the committee system? These questions go beyond the purview of this article, yet they are 
important to consider at a time of growing public dissatisfaction with politics both within 
and beyond the UK.  
 
 
IV. Concluding remarks 
 
The cumulative effect of the issues raised in the previous section suggests that evidence 
sessions are complex – and highly political – performances. They do not necessarily lead 
to what might be termed effective evidence sessions and are unlikely to be based on the 
best evidence available because political considerations take precedence. This matters 
because evidence matters. As the first section demonstrated, evidence is crucial for three 
reasons: (i) for the conduct of scrutiny; (ii) to build individual- and institutional-level 
expertise; and (iii) in order to act as a link between public and Parliament. Thus, 
understanding the sources and types of evidence on which MPs rely has significant 
repercussions. It gives us a better understanding on what kind of evidence they build their 
individual expertise and the evidence used to defend or critique government policy. 
Though committee scrutiny is usually praised as mechanisms of influence in the policy 
process (e.g. Benton and Russell, 2013), the findings from this article question whether or 
not committees’ abilities to scrutinise the executive would be further enhanced through a 
greater breadth of witnesses. Given that evidence is the foundation for committee scrutiny, 
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the basis of their evidence is crucial to hold government to account. Indeed, given that 
governments have repeatedly enshrined their commitment to ‘evidence-based policy-
making’ or ‘what works’, select committees’ capacities to gather and use a variety of 
evidence to evaluate government policy is crucial to make their reports more compelling 
and influential both within and outside Parliament. 
 
While more research could be done in this area to fully understand the role of evidence in 
parliamentary settings (e.g. the role of informal evidence, written evidence, the ‘usual 
suspects’, the framing of evidence sessions and the wider symbolic importance of 
evidence, weight of particular kinds of evidence in inquiries), the findings presented here 
raise important questions about the role of Parliament and its relationship to society. If 
we take seriously that Parliament must engage the public and that select committees offer 
that link (as both the Liaison Committee and the Speaker of the House of Commons have 
indicated), then the findings from this article raise concerns. If Parliament seems to be 
listening only from small sections of society, then this raises the question as to whether 
select committees are engaging with the problems that ordinary members of the public 
face in their day-to-day lives. This is arguably problematic at a time when the public’s faith 
in the political process, in general, and Parliament, in particular is in decline. While 
research on Parliament has done much to dispel the myths that the House of Commons 
makes no policy impact (Flinders and Kelso, 2011; Russell and Cowley, 2016; Thompson, 
2015), the findings presented here suggest that select committees must do more to 
diversify those that engage with parliamentary proceedings in order to ensure it is not 
perceived as a ‘remote and self-important echo chamber’, as Jeremy Paxman put it (The 
Guardian, 2013). 
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Table 1. Summary breakdown of witnesses 
 Total % of total % of category 
Government 257 8.0%  
Secretary of state 65 2.0% 25.3% 
Minister of state 106 3.3% 41.2% 
Parliamentary under-secretary of state 70 2.2% 27.2% 
Other government 16 0.5% 6.2% 
Civil service and public sector 1187 36.8%  
Central government department 412 12.8% 34.7% 
Arm's-length body 466 14.4% 39.3% 
Publicly-owned company 76 2.4% 6.4% 
Judiciary 10 0.3% 0.8% 
Local or regional official 123 3.8% 10.4% 
Public service staff 88 2.7% 7.4% 
Other official 12 0.4% 1.0% 
Higher education 260 8.1%  
Research council 11 0.3% 4.2% 
Research group 12 0.4% 4.6% 
Learned society and/or representative group 12 0.4% 4.6% 
Oxbridge 34 1.1% 13.1% 
Russell Group 136 4.2% 52.3% 
Million Plus 2 0.1% 0.8% 
University Alliance 7 0.2% 2.7% 
Non-affiliated 40 1.2% 15.4% 
International HE organisation 6 0.2% 2.3% 
Non-profit 949 29.4%  
Think tank or research institute 109 3.4% 11.5% 
Charity and/or campaign group 364 11.3% 38.4% 
Professional association or body 182 5.6% 19.2% 
Business and/or trade association 206 6.4% 21.7% 
Trade union 67 2.1% 7.1% 
International organisation 18 0.6% 1.9% 
Other 3 0.1% 0.3% 
Private sector 345 10.7%  
Small and/or medium-sized business 67 2.1% 19.4% 
Large/national business 108 3.3% 31.3% 
Multi-national business 160 5.0% 46.4% 
Business (size not known) 10 0.3% 2.9% 
Politician 120 3.7%  
Local or regional elected representative 85 2.6% 70.8% 
MPs and peers 30 0.9% 25.0% 
Opposition 2 0.1% 1.7% 
International  3 0.1% 2.5% 
Other 107 3.3%  
Independent expert 43 1.3% 40.2% 
Service user and/or member of public 13 0.4% 12.1% 
Campaigner 2 0.1% 1.9% 
Journalist/editor 18 0.6% 16.8% 
International 27 0.8% 25.2% 
Other 4 0.1% 3.7% 
Total 3225 100.0%  
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Table 2. Fifteen most frequent university witnesses 
Rank University Frequency 
1 University College London 26 
2 University of Oxford 24 
3 London School of Economics 19 
4 King’s College London 17 
5 University of Glasgow 12 
6 University of Cambridge 10 
7 University of Edinburgh 7 
=7 University of Manchester 7 
9 University of York 6 
=10 University of Stirling 5 
=10 Cardiff University 5 
=10 Imperial College London 5 
=10 University of Birmingham 5 
=14 University of Nottingham 4 
=14 University of Southampton 4 
 
 
Table 3. Geographical distribution of witnesses 
Region All witnesses 
All witnesses 
excluding gov’t, civil 
service and public 
sector 
Academic witnesses 
London 62.2% 47.1% 37.8% 
South of England 12.3% 18.0% 22.7% 
Midlands 3.9% 5.3% 5.3% 
Wales 2.2% 2.4% 4.0% 
Scotland 5.8% 8.3% 14.7% 
North of England 6.2% 7.9% 12.4% 
International and 
overseas territories 
2.3% 4.1% 2.7% 
Northern Ireland 1.3% 1.3% 0.0% 
Not known 3.8% 5.7% 0.4% 
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Figure 1. Gender distribution by committee 
 
Figure 2. Gender distribution by organisation 
